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CHAPTER IV

CLAIMS CONCERNING LAWFUL OBJECTS AND
METHODS OF BELLIGERENT ATTACK
The claims and counterclaims which are appraised in the present chapter include those concerning the highly coercive or violent combat interactions between belligerents. The most general claim is to attack certain
objects through the employment of particular methods or techniques of
attack. The countering ,claim is that particular objects are legally immune
and that particular methods are unlawful.
The basic legal principles of military necessity and humanity provide
broad guidance in distinguishing between lawful and unlawful objects of
attack. 1 In general, military necessity permits the selection as targets of
those objects which constitute the bases of the enemy belligerent's military
power. The humanity principle, in comparable generalization, prohibits
the selection of objects which are not effective bases of enemy military
power. Combatants who become disabled or helpless, for example, should
no longer be made objects of attack. In the same way, these principles are
used to determine the particular coercive methods which may be employed
]awfully against the enemy. The entire population of the enemy belligerent state constitutes an indispensable base of its power. It is usual, however, to divide the population between combatant members of the armed
forces and civilian noncombatants. It is obvious that each of these categories has a different relationship to the enemy military power. Combatants may be made direct objects of attack consistent with the law and
highly destructive methods may be employed lawfully against them. Non. combatants may not be attacked directly and it is not lawful to employ
highly destructive methods against them. Professor Lauterpacht h as stated
the central point:
It is clear that admission of a right to resort to the creation of terror
among the civilian population as being a legitimate object per se
would inevitably m ean the actual and forma l end of the law of warfare. For that reason, so long as the assump tion is allowed to subsist that there is a law of war, the prohibition of the weapon of
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terror not incidental to lawful operations must be regarded as an
absolute rule of law. 2
The conceptual distinction between combatants and noncombatants is
clear enough. A real difficulty, however, is caused by the blurring in fact
of the line between combatant and noncombatant which has taken place
in the present century. 3 The result is that in some coercive situations
combatants and noncombatants are not distinguishable. 4
In addition to protecting noncombatants, a rna jor objective of this
branch of international law is to regulate the processes of coercion and
violence in such a way as to permit and assist the transition from coercive
to peaceful procedures. The detailed rules prescribing the limits on violence involve two basic assumptions. 5 One is that widespread, wanton,
and unnecessary destruction of values tends permanently to embitter
relations between enemies so that the return to a constructive peace is
either very difficult or impossible. The other is that a peace of extermination, such as that imposed by Rome upon Carthage, is not a legally
permisssible objective. If it were lawful, all other limitations would
become meaningless.
In both World Wars, difficult legal issues were presented by the combat interactions between merchant ships and submarines. The present
chapter emphasizes such combat interactions involving claims concerning
objects and methods of attack. Claims concerning bombardment as a
method of warfare, including strategic nuclear bombardment, may be
considered more conveniently in Chapter V.

A. THE TRADITIONAL LAW CONCERNING OBJECTS AND
METHODS OF ATTACK IN NAVAL WARFARE
Chief Justice Marshall commented in 1815: "In point of fact, it is believed that a belligerent merchant vessel rarely sails unarmed .... " 6 In the
era when privateering and piracy were widespread, it was the general practice to arm nonbelligerent merchant ships as well. 7 Although the merchant
vessel's armament was designed for self-defense, this armament enabled it
to present a danger to any vessel whether privateer, pirate or warship. In
this factual context, warships were not under obligation to give unusual
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consideration to merchant ships which were themselves capable of initiating attack.
After the abandonment of privateering and the suppression of piracy,
it became exceptional for a merchant ship to be armed. 8 During the
second half of the nineteenth century warships were greatly improved in
both offensive armament and in defensive armor plating. 9 These and
other technical advances made the surface warship highly specialized for
military purposes and a very different ship from the merchantman. As a
result, merchant ships, even if armed, posed only a minor danger to such
warships. This military weakness of the merchant ship in relation to the
overwhelming military power of the surface warship afforded ample
reason to establish the principle that the merchantman and its personnel
were entitled to special protection and, in particular, could not be lawfully attacked without warning.
The custom developed in time of war whereby a belligerent warship,
rather than attacking a, merchant ship without warning, called upon it
to surrender or to submit to the procedure of visit and search. 10 The warship was legally justified in attacking only if the merchantman failed to
stop, attempted to escape, or otherwise resisted. In view of the military
superiority of the warship it was probably not entitled to use more force
to compel the submission of the merchant ship than was reasonably required in the circumstances.

I. Methods: Visit, Search, and Capture
In the context just described, the capture of merchant ships rather
than their destruction became the regular method employed by warships. 11
In the same way, the precedures of visit and search were employed regularly to enable boarding officers to determine the existence of probable
grounds for capture. 12
The following description of the procedures of visit, search, and capture
was prepared by the Harvard Research in International Law. Although
published in 1939, it reflects more accurately the principal procedural
steps as developed in earlier times:
( 1) In order to exercise the right of visit and search, a warship
signals the vessel as by radio or by firing a blank charge. If such
notice does not suffice, the warship may fire a projectile across the
bows of the vessel. Before this or simultaneously, the warship shall
hoist its flag, above which at night a light shall be placed. The
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vessel shall reply to the signal by hoisting its flag and by stopping
at once. Thereupon the warship sends to the vessel a boat manned
by an officer and by unarmed men of whom not more than two
shall accompany the officer on board the vessel. The boarding party
may examine the ship's papers and may interrogate persons on board.
It may inspect the cargo but the cargo may not be broken open
or removed. Postal correspondence may not be opened or removed.
( 2) If the vessel when summoned does not stop, attempts to escape,
or resists visit and search, it may be compelled to stop by force and
the belligerent shall not be responsible for resulting injury to life or
property.
(3) If the visit and search gives rise to a reasonable suspiCion
that the vessel or its cargo is subject to condemnation or preemption,
the vessel may be captured and brought or sent into port for prize
proceedings. 13
Paragraph ( 1) indicates the somewhat ceremonial character of visit
and search. The requirement that the men in the boat be unarmed reflects
the historical situation in which the warship possessed great military superiority over the merchant ship being visited. The requirement that each
vessel hoist "its" flag was designed to outlaw the use of false flags as a
ruse. Although the Harvard Research refers to radio, this means of communication did not exist during most of the time that visit and search
was a viable naval procedure. At that time information was obtained by
visit and search which could not be obtained or communicated in other
ways.
It should be noticed that even under the traditional law, as indicated
by paragraph ( 2) above, the warship is entitled to use force where the
merchant vesssel offers resistance. In extreme cases, this included sinking
the merchant vessel where the resistance could not be overcome otherwise.
The rights of visit, search, and capture belonged only to the duly commissioned warships of belligerent states. 14 They were directed at merchant
ships, whether belligerent or neutral, and could be exercised anywhere
on the high seas or in belligerent territorial waters but not in neutral territorial waters. 15 The central purpose was to ascertain the relevant fact~
concerning the merchant ship including its enemy or neutral status and
the origin, destination, and character of the vessel and its cargo. 16 It at
least a prima facie case for capture was made out as a result of the visit
and search, the warship then had legal authority to make the capture
13
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even though the prize court might later release the merchant ship in the
light of further evidence subsequently developed in the case. 17 The right
of visit and search was ancillary to the right of capture rather than being
independent. 18 Thus, if there was reliable evidence, extrinsic to the merchant vessel itself, indicating its liability to capture, it could be lawfully
captured without visit and search. 19

2. Objects: Enemy Ships and Goods
Under the traditional law as in the modern law, warships are subject
to capture or destruction. It is, of course, lawful to attack warships without warning. Where an enemy public vessel is captured its title is immediately transferred to the captor state and prize proceedings are not necessary.2o
There is a basic distinction in international law between the treatment
of enemy property on land .and the treatment of enemy property at sea.
The law of land warfare· makes a fundamental distinction between public
and private property. The general rule is that private property on land is
immune from capture by the enemy/ 1 with some exceptions based upon
urgent military necessity. The law of naval warfare does not provide
immunity for enemy private property (ships and cargoes) at sea. The
reason for this differential treatment is not difficult to ascertain. In land
warfare, the military occupation of enemy territory prevents the enemy
belligerent state from exercising control over the property and using it for
war purposes. 22 In these circumstances no substantial military interest is
frustrated by leaving private property with its private owner. In naval
warfare, however, it is necessary to obtain control of enemy private property through capture or destruction in order to prevent its possible use in
behalf of the enemy's war effort. Even where the enemy state does not
control the transactions of its private traders, it is recognized that the net
result of the transactions is to strengthen the enemy war effort. Enemy
private property, consequently, has always been a lawful object of appropriation or destruction in naval warfare except for certain immunities. 23
The traditional law required that enemy private ships which were captured must be brought to port and subjected to prize proceedings to determine on the evidence before the Court whether they were actually enemy
17
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ships and so subject to capture. 24 In exceptional circumstances it was
legally permissible to destroy an enemy merchant ship after capture if
the personnel and ship's papers were removed to a place of safety. 25 When
this was done the Prize Court must be subsequently satisfied that both
the capture and· the destruction were legally justified. 26 Otherwise, the
capturing state was liable in damages to the enemy owner.
A belligerent was traditionally entitled to capture enemy private goods
carried under a neutral flag. 27 The British adhered to this view in the
face of opposition from other states which argued for the principle of
"free ships, free goods." 28 France, in opposition to Great Britain and
other states, claimed the right to capture neutral goods on enemy vessels. 29
The British and the French were allied against Russia during the
Crimean War. As a wartime expedient they agreed that Great Britain
would not seize enemy goods on neutral vessels and that France would
not appropriate neutral goods on enemy vessels. 30 Both agreed that they
would not employ privateers. 31 After the termination of the war the
principal maritime powers agreed to the Declaration of Paris ( 1856)
which provided:
1. Privateering is, and remains abolished;

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of
contraband of war;
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are
not liable to capture under enemy's flag;
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective: that is to
say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the
coast of the enemy. 32
The Declaration of Paris did not purport to change the old rule that
private enemy ships and private enemy goods on them could be captured.33 The British had agreed to give up the right to seize enemy goods
under the neutral flag in return for the French agreement to refrain from
capture of neutral goods on enemy vessels. The agreement to abolish
privateering was regarded as highly significant but in reality was less so
since privateering was already technologically obsolescent in view of the
24
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increasing specialization of warships. Since a principal purpose of the
Declaration was to protect private property, it is probable that the enemy
goods referred to in the second article did not include state-owned enemy
goods. 34 The rule embodied in this article was substantially frustrated
a few years later in the American Civil War by the development of the
doctrine of continuous voyage. 35 This doctrine was used to look beyond
the stated or nominal destination of goods to ascertain whether or not
their ultimate destination was the enemy. The Declaration was abandoned
by both sides in the early part of the First World War. 36

3. Objects: Neutral Ships and Goods
The traditional law subjected neutral ships and goods to capture
only where specific rights of the capturing belligerent had been violated.37
The grounds for the captur~ o,f neutral ships included breach of blockade,
resistance to visit and search, carriage of contraband, and some other types
of assistance to the enemy belligerent which were characterized as "unneutral service." 38 In order to justify capture of a neutral merchant ship
for breach of the traditional close-in blockade it was necessary to meet
certain requirements including proper notification of the blockade to
neutrals. In order to impose liability to capture for carriage of contraband,
notification to neutrals of the contraband list was required. The threefold
classification of free goods, conditional contraband, and absolute contraband was employed to determine the military value of the goods to the
enemy. 39 "Unneutral service" included both the transportation of persons
on behalf of the enemy and the transmission of intelligence to the enemy.
These situations were regarded as roughly analogous to carrying contraband and resulted in subjecting the merchant vessel involved to treatment
similar to that for carrying contraband. 40 Another type of unneutral
service arose when the neutral merchant vessel toook a direct part in the
hostilities or acted under the direct orders of an agent of the enemy government such as sailing in a convoy protected by enemy warships or transporting enemy troops. In such situations the status of the neutral merchant
vessel was assimilated to that of an enemy one and it would thus be exposed to capture and condemnation in prize as if it were an enemy.4 1
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There were significant legal differences between the capture of enemy
and neutral merchant vessels. 42 Enemy merchant vessels were subject to
capture generally for the purpose of appropriating them and their cargo
pursuant to the right of a belligerent to capture and appropriate enemy
private property at sea. The capture itself was a provisional appropriation
and it was subject to confirmation through the prize court proceedings.
The neutral merchant vessel could be lawfully captured and condemned
only where it had violated specific rights of the belligerent.
The unratified Declaration of London ( 1909) 43 represented an attempt
to provide an international codification of the traditional law. Among
other detailed provisions, it contained a list of free goods 44 which were
"not susceptible of use in war" and which belligerents were prohibited
from treating as either absolute or conditional contraband. 45 Mr. ArnoldFoster has commented critically upon this aspect of the Declaration:
It put iron ore on the free list, so that all such ore would be free to
pass straight through a British blockade to Krupps' munition works
at Essen. Yet the foundation of modern war potential is steel: a
nation's capacity to produce steel is one of the surest measures of its
military strength.
Rubber for motor tyres was on the free list, although, as was soon
found in the war of 1914, much of the mobility of modern armies
depends on motor transport. The Declaration authorized seizure of
guns and shells, but not the metals for making them: explosives
might be seized but not cotton or nitrates. 46
At the beginning of the First World War the United States invited the
belligerents to adhere to the Declaration. 47 Germany and Austria-Hungary
agreed to do so conditioned upon Allied agreement which was not forthcoming. 48 Thereafter, the Declaration was swept away by the reprisal
orders of the British and the actual economic warfare practices of the
Germans.
In summary, the traditional law concerning objects and methods of
attack was based upon certain factual conditions which actually existed
42
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in the second half of the nineteenth century. The merchant vessel's immunity from attack without warning was based on its military impotence
in relation to the warship. Merchant vessels were not only privately owned
but were also privately controlled. Specifically, the private owner, whether
in peacetime or in wartime, determined the voyage and the cargo. It is
clear that these factual conditions only concerned surface vessels since
submarines were not demonstrated to be effective naval units until 1914
and 1915. It is probable that the Declaration of London was obsolete in
1908 and 1909 when it was written. It was demonstrated to be obsolete
beyond any reasonable doubt in the first half of the First World War. 49
During the same time, the international law of prize became increasingly
obsolescent. 50

B. CLAIMS CONCERMNG OBJECTS AND METHODS OF
ATTACK IN GENERAL WAR
In Chapter III some consideration was given to the objects and methods
of belligerent attack which were closely related to submarine operational
areas. It was there concluded that visit and search at sea was a hazardous
undertaking for surface warships as well as for submarines in modern
conditions of general war at sea. 51 It was also concluded that the utilization of Q-ships as an antisubmarine measure made it even more hazardous
for submarines to undertake the traditional procedure of visit and search. 52
It will be recalled that Q-ships appeared to be innocent merchantmen
but were in reality heavily armed warships.

I. Capture or Destruction of Enemy Warships
Only belligerent warships are legally empowered to make an attack
upon warships of the enemy belligerent. 53 Since submarine warships have
the same status as lawful combatant units possessed by surface warships
they are similarly empowered to attack the warships of the enemy belligerent. One of the tactical functions of attack submarines is to attack enemy
submarines. 54 The same basic legal doctrines apply to such naval engagements as to those between surface warships.
49
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All enemy warships including naval auxiliaries, whether armed or unarmed, are lawful objects of attack without warning 55 and without regard
to whether the attack takes place in a submarine operational area or
elsewhere. Attack upon enemy warships may be made anywhere on the
high seas or in the territorial waters of any belligerent state but not in
neutral territorial waters.
During both World Wars warships were expensive and valuable vessels
and their capture by the opposing belligerent would be militarily desirable.
As a practical matter, however, there were relatively few instances of
capture of warships. Among these instances, a small number of submarines
were captured. 56 In spite of the desirability of capture, the naval technology during the World Wars and particularly the long-range effectiveness
of both gunfire and torpedoes made the destruction of enemy warships the
normal attack objective.
2. ·Capture or Destruction of Enemy Merchant Ships
An enemy merchant ship, as well as its cargo, represents considerable
economic value. Consequently, the interests of a belligerent would be most
obviously served by capturing such a ship and having it and its cargo condemned by the prize court. 57 Although this is a lawful procedure and
there may still be rare occasions where it can be employed, it is clear that
capture was a highly unusual situation in both World Wars.
a. WORLD WAR I

In 1913 the British Admiralty announced the arming of a number
of merchant vessels. 58 The measure was stated to be a response to the
danger presented by foreign powers which claimed the right to convert
merchant ships into warships either in port or on the high seas. The
announcement stressed that the British merchant vessels which were to be
armed would retain their status as private merchantmen since they were
armed for defensive purposes only. It was also emphasized that their status
would be entirely different from that of the British armed merchant
cruisers which would be commissioned as regular warships in the event
of war. Thus, the United Kingdom at the beginning of the First World
War had a number of merchant ships which were stated to be armed
55
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against other dangers but which, in the actual event, could use their arms
against submarines. 59
It has been stated previously that the principal objects of attack of
German submarines at the beginning of the war were enemy warships
and that the submarines were later redirected against enemy merchant
vessels. In the early part of the war German submarines made at least
some attempt to comply with the traditional procedures of visit and search.
The arming of British merchant ships and the use of the arms against
German submarines, along with other antisubmarine activities, did not
facilitate this attempt. It soon became apparent that even a British armed
merchant ship sailing alone presented a very real military danger to German submarines which attempted to comply with the traditional law. The
predictable result of the new situation was that considerations of military
necessity, as well as simple_self-preservation, led to the submarines remaining submerged and making torpedo attacks without warning. The bestknown case involving sinking without warning was the Lusitania which
has been referred to earlier. 60 The only realistic alternative to this submarine tactic was to abandon effective use of the submarine. In this situation the British argued the inhumanity, and consequent illegality, of submarine attacks without warning on merchant vessels. While this had
considerable impact as propaganda, it did not have a corresponding influence upon the actual conduct of naval warfare. After the convoying
of merchant ships was adopted by the Allies during the First World War 61
it was difficult enough for a German submarine to avoid the naval escorts
and make a successful attack without warning upon Allied merchant ships
in a convoy. As a practical matter, it was impossible for submarines to
capture convoyed ships. In both World Wars, Allied sea power drove German merchant ships from the high seas in a very short time. 62 When the
capture of a German merchant ship was attempted, the practice of attempting scuttling to avoid capture was usually employed. 63
59
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The result of this, as stated previously, was that the Declarations of
Paris and London were no longer susceptible of application in the new
factual context. Professor H. A. Smith has provided apt summary concerning the Declaration of Paris, after indicating that it must be interpreted
"in the light of the political and economic structure of the mid-nineteenth
century":
If we are again confronted with the facts for which the Declaration
laid down the law, then that law must be applied to those facts. That
is to say, if we can discover a genuine enemy private merchant carrying on his own trade in his own way for his own profit, then we must
admit that his non-contraband goods carried in neutral ships are
immune from capture at sea. Under the conditions of the modern
socialistic world such a person is not easily to be found. In the books
of the last generation he was commonly called the 'innocent merchant', and the disappearance of this phrase from the literature of
our day has its own significance. To-day he has become a disciplined
individual mobilised in the vast military organization of the totalitarian
State. It would be a defiance both of the letter and the spirit of the
Declaration of Paris to bring within its protection the mobilised
forces of the enemy. 64
In its role as the honest neutral broker between the naval belligerents
the United States sought a modus vivendi which would be acceptable to
both the United Kingdom and Germany. 65 On January 18, 1916 Secretary
of State Lansing made a proposal to the British Government which was
designed to "bring submarine warfare within the general rules of international law and the principles of humanity without destroying its efficiency in the destruction of commerce . . . ." 66 If the British accepted
he would then press it upon the Germans. Its central part stated:
[S]ubmarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant vessels,
determining their belligerent nationality, and removing the crews
and passengers to places of safety before sinking the vesssels as prizes
of war; and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should·
be prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever.67
Among the propositions upon which the note was stated to be based
were these two:
A merchant vessel of enemy nationality should not be attacked without being ordered to stop.
84
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An enemy merchant vessel, when ordered to do so by a belligerent
submarine, should immediately stop. 68
In concluding the note Secretary Lansing observed:
I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament
of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the
defensive weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary
cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly. 69
The proposal appeared to be a compromise which would exact concessions from each side while providing some recompense. The Allies were
to be required to disarm their merchant ships and to cooperate with
submarines attempting to exercise visit and search. Since the traditional
law permitted capture, Germany would be legally entitled to capture
Allied merchantmen. In -return, the merchant ships of the Allies were not
to be subjected to attack without warning. Further, it was possible that
the United States would treat a merchant vessel with any kind of armament
as "an auxiliary cruiser," that is, a warship.
Certain practical considerations, however, made the concessions to Germany more apparent than real. German submarines could not carry prize
crews to place aboard captured merchantmen. In addition, with Allied
supremacy on the surface of the seas, such a captured merchantman would
shortly be recaptured or sunk by Allied naval forces. Germany could not
sink the merchant vessels as prizes unless the ship's boats were to be considered a place of safety. 70 It is difficult to envision any situation other than
calm weather and close proximity to land where the lifeboats actually
would be such a place of safety. In view of these factors, it is doubtful
that Germany could have accepted the proposal even if the Allies had done
so. There was, however, no disposition on the part of either the United
Kingdom or France to agree to it. The United States Ambassador in
London reported that the proposal was regarded there as wholly in favor
of Germany 71 and that if the United States persisted in advancing it this
action would be viewed as "unfriendly interference." 72 Secretary Lansing
had invoked humanity in presenting the proposal, but it was not realistic
to expect the belligerents to give humanity priority over considerations of
military efficiency.
One result of the United States proposal was that it gave Germany an
68
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opportunity to reevaluate its position on armed merchant vessels. Germany
had captured a set of British Admiralty confidential instructions to armed
merchant ships on the British steamer Woodfield. These instructions, in
the German view, provided conclusive evidence of the illegal methods of
warfare employed by British armed merchantmen. The Woodfield instructions provided in part:
If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship by day, and it is evident
to the master that she has hostile intentions, the ship pursued should
open fire in self-defense, notwithstanding the submarine may not have
committed a definite hostile act, such as firing a gun or torpedo. 73
It is interesting to apply this instruction to the situation where a submarine attempts to exercise the right of visit and search. The merchant
ship master may reasonably believe that the submarine has "hostile intentions," so he may open fire first. In fact, almost any approach by a submarine could be regarded as pursuit of the merchant ship under the
instructions. 74
On February 10, 1916 the United States Ambassador in Germany sent
the Secretary of State a German Government memorandum on the treatment of armed merchantmen. It stated, inter alia:
The German Government has no doubt that a merchantman assumes a warlike character by armament with guns, regardless of
whether the guns are intended to serve for defense or attack. It considers any warlike activity of an enemy merchantman contrary to
international law, although it accords consideration to the opposite
view by treating the crew of such a vessel not as pirates but as
belligerents. 75
The conclusion was that:
In the circumstances set forth above, enemy merchantmen armed
with guns no longer have any right to be considered as peaceable
vessels of commerce. Therefore the German naval forces will receive
orders, within a short period, paying consideration to the interests
of the neutrals, to treat such vessels as belligerents. 76
73

ld. at 191, 196.
Shortly after the start of the First World War the British had given the United States Government:
the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes of attack, that they are merely peaceful traders armed only for defence,
that they will never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never under any
circumstances attack any vessel.
ld. at 188.
70
[1916] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 163, 164 (1929).
76
Id. at 165.
The German memorandum of February 10, 1916 was modified slightly in a further
note of February 28, 1916 which stated in relevant part:
The orders issued to the German naval commanders are so formulated that
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The German reevaluation concerning merchant ships as the objects of
submarine attack set forth in this note was based principally upon the
distinction between armed and unarmed merchant ships. This placed the
burden upon the submarine commander to make sure that a particular
merchantman was armed before the submarine could attack without warning. As a practical matter, this probably resulted in a number of Allied
armed merchant ships not being subjected to attack without warning
because of uncertainty concerning their armament. Consistent with this
note, Germany could still apologize for sinking the unarmed belligerent
merchant ship Lusitania and state that it was contrary to instructions for
German submarines to sink unarmed merchantmen. 77
The United States Government issued a further statement on the status
of armed merchant ships on March 25, 1916. This "memorandum," which
was not labeled a reply to the German memorandum, provided, inter alia:
A presumption base_d solely on the presence of an armament on a
merchant vessel of ari enemy is not a sufficient reason for a belligerent
to declare it to be a warship and proceed to attack it without regard
to the rights of the persons on board. Conclusive evidence of a purpose
to use the armament for aggression is essential . . . . [A] belligerent
warship can on the high seas test by actual experience the purpose
of an armament on an enemy merchant vessel, and so determine by
direct evidence the status of the vessel. 78
This United States memorandum represented a return to pro-Allied
policy in the guise of a return to the traditional law. 79 The German
memorandum had accepted full responsibility for determining whether
or not particular merchant ships were armed. The United States memorandum went further. Where the submarine was able to ascertain that the
merchant ship was armed, this was only the beginning of the inquiry. It
must then "test by actual experience the purpose of an armament on an
enemy merchant vessel." In other words, the submarine was to give the
armed merchant ship the opportunity to attack first. If the merchant ship
attacked and the submarine was not sunk, it would then be free to treat
the merchant ship as a warship and counterattack. If the merchant ship
did not use its armament to attack the ~ubmarine, the submarine could
presumably proceed with visit and ~earch to determine whether the merchant ship was subject to capture. It does not require extended analysis
to conclude that the United States memorandum, if actually applied,
enemy liners may not be destroyed on account of their armament unless such
armament is proved.
I d. at 181-82.
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would have imposed a wholly unreasonable burden upon Germany and its
submarine warships. In many situations the result of a submarine attempting to obtain "direct evidence" would be the sinking of the submarine.
In addition, the "direct evidence" was not necessary. The assumption,
implicit in the memorandum, that each British merchant ship master
decided ad hoc as to the employment of the armament was false. The
purpose of the comprehensive instructions captured on the Woodfield was
to substitute British Government control for the discretion of the individual
master or ship owner. 80
Thereafter, as is well known, the United States went to war against
Germany. The ostensible reason was alleged German violations of the law
of naval warfare. President Wilson in his address to the Congress on April
2, 1916 recommending a declaration of war stated, inter alia:
The new [German] policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels
of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their
destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board,
the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents ....
. . . I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense
and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children,
engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods
of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property
can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people can not
be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a
warfare against mankind. 81
One cannot help but sympathize with the "noncombatants" who through
acts of more or less volition went to sea and became the victims of the
naval war. In the same way one must sympathize with German civilians
who, without volition, became the victims of the long-distance blockade.
In explaining the basis for treating foodstuffs to Germany as contraband,
the British Foreign Secretary stated in early 1915:
The reason for drawing a distinction between foodstuffs intended
for the civil population and those for the armed forces or enemy
Government disappears when the distinction between the civil popula- ·
tion and the armed forces itself disappears. 82
80

In addition to the Woodfield instructions quoted in the text accompanying supra
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As a belligerent the United States h elped the United Kingdom to
perfect the merchant ship as an effective combatant unit. The United
States, like the United Kingdom, armed its merchant ships 83 and sailed
them in convoys escorted by naval vessels. In addition, the United States
exercised comprehensive government control over the voyages sailed and
the cargoes carried by merchant shipping to insure that it was employed
in the most efficient manner possible in behalf of the war effort. 84
The outcome of the combat interactions between merchant ships and
submarines in the First World War was that each treated the other as a
lawful object of attack which could be sunk without warning. This reciprocal situation was summarized in the report of the United States Advisory
Committee at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament
which stated:
'The merchant ship sank the submarine if it came near enough; the
submarine sought and destroyed the merchant ship without even a
knowledge of national~ty or guilt. . . . Defensive [merchant ship]
armament was almost sure to be used offensively in an attempt to strike
a first blow. 85

b. WORLD WAR II
At the beginning of the Second World War the naval belligerents
on both sides took up where matters had been left in 1918. For example,
they acted without any regard to the D eclaration of London. The contraband lists published by the principal belligerents in September 1939 were
even more comprehensive in scope than those employed in the latter part
of the First World War. 86 The British Government put into effect all of
83
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the techniques of merchant ship warfare which it had learned so slowly
and painfully during the First World War as well as some new ones. 87
British merchant ships were armed 88 and were sailed in that most effective
of offensive and defensive antisubmarine warfare methods: the convoy
escorted by antisubmarine warships and aircraft. 89 All British merchant
ships were subject to comprehensive direction and control by the British
Government.9 ° Captain R oskill has summarized the pattern of government
control over merchant shipping:
On 26th August 1939 there was issued in Whitehall an order which
established the' pattern under which the whole of the British Merchant
Navy was to work for the next six years. It stated that the Cabinet
Committee responsible for 'Defence Preparedness' had, in consultation
with the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, authorised the
Admiralty 'to adopt compulsory control of movements of merchant
shipping.... ' Parallel with this assumption of operational control by
the Admiralty, other government directives transferred the responsibility for the loading and unloading of all merchant ships from their
owners to the Ministry of Shipping. 91
It is significant that the strategic control of British merchant ships, like
that of warships, was vested directly in the Admiralty. 9 2 British instructions
concerning the tactical em ployment of armed merchant ships, which had
been prepared before the war, were put into effect. One portion of the
Defense of Merchant Shipping Han d book ( 1938) concerned "reporting
the enemy" and provided that it is the merchant ship master's
first and most important duty to report the nature and position of the
enemy by wireless telegraphy. Such a report promptly made may be
the means of saving not only the ship herself but many others; for
it may give an opportunity for the destruction of her assailant by our
warships or aircraft, an opportunity which might not recur. 93
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On the important subject, "conditions under which fire may be opened,"
the Hand book stated that if the enemy adopts a policy of sinking merchant
ships without warning
it will then be permissible to open fire on an enemy surface vessel,
submarine or aircraft, even before she has attacked or demanded
surrender, if to do so will tend to prevent her gaining a favourable
position for attacking. 94
Subsequent instructions stated that the enemy had adopted such a policy
of sinking without warning. 95
At the beginning of the war the German Navy used the Protocol of
1936 as the basis for the conduct of submarine warfare. The Protocol
was incorporated almost verbatim into article 74 of the German Prize
Code of 1939. 96 Thereafter, changes were introduced by degrees until "an
order was issued on 17 ~ October 1939 to attack all enemy merchant ships
without warning." 97 Thus, quite early in the Second World War merchant
ships and submarines of the opposing belligerents were attacking one another without warning. The judgment of the International Military Tribunal in the case of Admiral Donitz summarizes the steps involved in the
progressive utilization of German submarines:
Donitz insists that at all times the Navy remained within the confines
of international law and of the Protocol. He testified that when the
war began, the guide to submarine warfare was the German Prize
Ordinance taken almost literally from the Protocol, that pursuant to
the German view, he ordered submarines to attack all merchant ships
in convoy, and all that refused to stop or used their radio upon sighting a submarine. When his reports indicated that British merchant
ships were being used to give information by wireless, were being
armed, and were attacking submarines on sight, he ordered his submarines on 17 October 1939 to attack all enemy merchant ships without warning on the ground that resistance was to be expected. Orders
already had been issued on 21 September 1939 to attack all ships,
94
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including neutrals, sailing at night without lights in the English
Channel. 98
Admiral Donitz was charged generally with "waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936." 99 The aspects
of the case concerning submarine operational areas have been appraised
previously. 100 The charges concerning objects and methods of attack related to the sinking of merchant ships and the treatment of survivors of
sunken ships.
In his argument on behalf of Admiral Donitz, Flottenrichter Kranzbuhler
referred to the "great struggle which took place between the U -boats on
the one hand, and the armed merchant vessels equipped with guns and
depth charges on the other hand, as equal military opponents." 101 He
contended that:
According to German legal opinion a ship which is equipped and
utilized for battle does not come under the provisions granting protection against sinking without warning as laid down by the London
Protocol for merchant ships. I wish to stress the fact that the right of
the merchant ship to carry weapons and to fight is not thereby contested. The conclusion drawn from this fact is reflected in the
well-known formula: "He who resorts to weapons must expect to be
answered by weapons." 102
His argument, it should be mentioned, accurately reflects the close
relationship between lawful combatants and lawful objects of attack. The
prosecution merely responded that it was "untenable" to regard the sinking
of Allied merchant ships without warning as legally justified by the Allied
merchant ship tactics. 103 The Tribunal dealt with British armed merchant
ships in the following passage:
Shortly after the outbreak of war the British Admiralty, in accordance with its Hand book of Instructions of 1938 to the Merchant Navy,
armed its merchant vessels, in m any cases convoyed them with armed
escort, gave orders to send position reports upon sighting submarines,
thus integrating merchant vessels into the warning network of naval
intelligence. On 1 October 1939 the British Admiralty announced
that British merchant ships h ad been ordered to ram U-boats if possible.
In the actual circumstances of this case, the Tribunal is not prepared
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to hold Donitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against
British armed merchant ships. 104
According to its terms this holding applied to "British armed merchant
ships." It is a wise holding in the light of the full participation of these
merchant ships in combat. 105 Writing in 1940 Professor Borchard recalled
that the historic immunity of merchant ships had been based upon their
military weakness in relation to warships and stated:
[W]hen merchant ships became speedy, powerful and armed and the
vulnerable submarine appeared on the scene, the reason for immunity
from unwarned attack disappeared. It is elementary that an armed
belligerent merchant ship, especially when under orders to attack
submarines at sight, is a fighting ship, subject to all the dangers of
the belligerent character.... 1 06
The Tribunal made no specific holding concerning British unarmed
merchant ships. It is possible that the broad term "armed merchant ships"
may have been used to apply to all British merchant ships actually participating in the British naval war effort, such as sailing in convoy or sending
submarine position reports, without regard to whether a particular ship
was armed. It is important for the purpose of accurate legal analysis to
determine whether only armed merchant ships or any merchant ships
participating in the naval war effort may be sunk without warning. An
analysis of the Protocol is essential in this inquiry.
The Protocol has been set forth in Chapter III in connection with
submarine operational areas. 107 Its first paragraph provides that in their
action with regard to "merchant ships" submarines must obey the same
international law rules which are applicable to surface vessels. Its second
paragraph enunciates a general rule concerning methods of attack to be
employed against "a merchant vessel" by both submarine and surface
104
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warships. This general rule is that the warship "may not sink or render
incapable of navigation" a merchant ship without first placing "passengers,
crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety." It is further specified that
the ship's boats may not be regarded as a place of safety unless, taking
account of weather conditions, the proximity of land or the presence of a
potential rescue vessel makes them safe. The general rule enunciated is
subjected to these two exceptions in which, it should be noticed, the adjectives "persistent" and "active" are used: 108 ( 1) "persistent refusal to stop
on being duly summoned"; (2) "active resistance to visit and search."
The black letter statement in the Harvard Research, Draft Convention
on the Law of Treaties enunciates well-established criteria to be used in
treaty interpretation. It provides:
A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose
which it is intended to serve. The historical background of the treaty,
travaux preparatories, the circumstances of the parties at the time the
treaty was entered into, the change in these circumstances sought to
be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the
provisions of the treaty, and the conditions prevailing at the time
interpretation is being made, are to be considered in connection
with the general purpose which the treaty is intended to serve. 109
The multifactor approach set forth is designed, inter alia, to avoid the
oversimplistic "plain meaning" approach to treaty interpretation. It should
require no extended analysis here to indicate the intellectual inadequacy
of the "plain meaning" device in dealing with a serious interpretative
problem. 110 In the words of the late Judge Anzilotti of the International
Court:
But I do not see how it is possible to say that an article of a convention is clear until the subject and aim of the convention have been
ascertained, for the article only assumes its true import in this convention and in relation thereto. 111
The most general purpose of article 22 of the London Naval Treaty
of 1930 and of the Protocol of 1936, which embodies the same rules, 112
was to provide some regulation of submarine warships in view of the nonratification of Senator Root's resolutions which were set forth in the ill108
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fated Submarine Treaty of 1922. 113 It may be suggested, in consequence,
that the regulation of submarines contemplated was not to be so stringent
as to preclude ratification. The United States, the United Kingdom,
Japan, France, and Italy were the parties to the London Naval Treaty of
1930. Perhaps the clearest feature of their "subsequent conduct" in "applying the provisions of the treaty" in World War II is that they did not regard its protection as being extended to merchant ships, whether armed or
not, which participated in the conduct of the naval war. It is reasonable
to expect that this unanimous working interpretation of all five of the
parties to the Treaty would have been entitled to the greatest deference by
the International Military Tribunal if it had considered specifically the
status of unarmed belligerent merchant ships participating in the naval
war effort. In addition, Germany, which adhered to the Protocol, employed
the same interpretation during the war.
As to "the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being
made," the Tribunal should have been aware that the Protocol had not
actually precluded the effective use of the submarine against merchant
ships participating in the war or hostilities either in the Atlantic or in the
Pacific. There is no reason to believe that the prohibition of the effective
use of submarines against such merchant ships was part of the general
purpose of the Treaty and the Protocol. If it had been, it is most probable
that France would not have adhered to the Treaty 114 and that Germany
would not have adhered to the same provisions subsequently embodied in
the Protocol.
The first paragraph of the Treaty, by requiring submarines to comply
with the rules applicable to surface warships, does compel the submarine
to come to the surface and lose its capability of surprise attack. From a
naval tactical viewpoint such a requirement is reasonable provided only
that the "merchant ship" involved is not participating in the war or hostilites. It has been stated concerning the Treaty that "merchant ships" in
the first paragraph and "a merchant vessel" in the second paragraph are
highly ambiguous terms. 115 Much of the ambiguity is resolved by the "Report of the Committee of Jurists" (April 3, 1930) concerning the wording
of article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. This report, prepared
by the lawyers who drafted the Treaty, states in relevant part:
The Committee wish to place it on record that the expression "mer113
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chant vessel," where it is employed in the declaration, is not to be
understood as including a merchant vessel which is at the moment
participating in hostilities in such a manner as to cause her to lose
her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel. 116
The stated criteria is considerably more realistic than a test which
attempts to distinguish only between armed and unarmed merchant vessels. The criteria should certainly include, inter alia, any armed merchant
vessel and no consideration should be given to the purported distinction
between "defensive" and "offensive" armament. It should not, however,
be limited to armed vessels because there are many modes of unarmed
participation in hostilities. For example, a fast unarmed passenger liner
employed as a troop transport during war or hostilities should not be
entitled to "the immunities of a merchant vessel." 117 During the Second
World War the Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth were so employed in
behalf of the Allied war effort. 118 It is clear that they represented a very
substantial addition of military power to the Allied side. Such a vessel,
though unarmed, is a far more effective participant in the hostilites than
many slower and smaller armed vessels. In addition, if the fast liner engaged in carrying troops were to sail at a much slower speed and be escorted by a small warship, it would be subject to attack without warning.
Reference has been made to the military significance of an enemy mercant ship making radio reports of submarine sightings. 119 In particular
combat contexts it is probably far more important for the efficient conduct
of antisubmarine warfare to have radio reports made by merchant ships
than to have such ships armed.
In summary, the juridical criteria to determine whether or not a merchant vessel is participating in the war or hostilities in a way which results
in losing "the immunities of a merchant vessel" should be determined
by the fact of such participation and not by the particular method of
participation. In a general war in which almost all belligerent merchant
ships are so participating, it may, as a practical matter of tactics, be necessary for belligerent submarines to treat all enemy merchant ships as lawful
objects of attack without warning. In unusual circumstances, perhaps involving a solitary merchantman far from the regular trade routes/ 20 •
where it is possible for submarines to determine the nonparticipant status
of a particular ship, it is clear that they are legally obligated to do so.
The consequence of the foregoing appraisal, that the Protocol is designed
to protect only those merchant ships which are not participating in the
116
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war or hostilities, is the conclusion that there was not consistent violation
of the Protocol by any of the major naval belligerents during the Second
World War.
Professor Tucker has reached different conclusions concerning this subject. He has written concerning the Protocol in the Atlantic war:
Despite this reaffirmation of the traditional law in the 1936 London
Protocol, the record of belligerent measures with respect to enemy
merchant vessels during World War II fell far below the standards
set in the preceding conflict. In the Atlantic Germany resorted to
unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against British merchant
vessels almost from the very start of hostilities .... 121
. . . In the final stages of the conflict the measures taken by Great
Britain against enemy shipping wherever encountered were only barely
distinguishable from a policy of unrestricted warfare. 122
Concerning the role of the Protocol in the Pacific war, Professor Tucker
has written :
In the Pacific no attempt was made by either of the major naval
belligerents to observe the obligations laid down by the 1936 London
Protocol. Immediately upon the outbreak of war the United States
initiated a policy of unrestricted aerial and submarine warfare against
Japanese merchant vessels, and consistently pursued this policy
throughout the course of hostilities. Japan, in turn, furnished no evidence of a willingness to abide by the provisions of the Protocol. ... 123
Professor Tucker has apparently assumed that the Protocol is designed
to protect merchant vessels which are participating in the naval war
effort. This does not take adequate account of the close relationship
between the performance of combatant functions and the ensuing liability
to attack without warning. In addition, it is inconsistent with the legislative history concerning the interpretaton of "merchant vessel" as used in
the Protocol. 124
The comprehensive participation of Allied merchant ships in the
Atlantic war has been described. There is no reason to believe that Allied
merchant ships were employed differently in the Pacific war. 125 As to
121
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Japanese merchant ships in the Pacific war, a U.S. Navy press release in
1946 stated in part:
[T] he conditions under which Japan employed her so-called merchant shipping was [sic] such that it would be impossible to distinguish between "merchant ships" and Japanese Army and Navy
auxiliaries.... 126

c. THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
The U.S. Navy official instructions concerning objects of attack
should be examined. Article 503 (b) ( 3) of the Law of Naval Warfare 127
provides:
Enemy merchant vessels may 'be attacked and destroyed, either with
or without prior warning, in any of the following circumstances:
1. Actively resisting visit and search or capture.
2. Refusing to stop upon being duly summoned.
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft.
4. If armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has
been used, or is intended for use, offensively against an enemy.
5. If incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system
of an enemy's armed forces.
6. If acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an
enemy's armed forces.
The first paragraph is consistent with the second exception to the general rule set forth in the Protocol. 128 Paragraph ( 2) would be consistent
with the first exception to the general rule in the Protocol if it stressed
the persistent character of the refusal to stop. 129 As stated previously, the
adjectives "persistent" and "active" in the second paragraph of the Protocol must be given full effect since they, or equivalent expressions, were
not usually employed in the traditional law. Paragraph ( 3) accurately
reflects the traditional law as well as the uniform practice of the two World
Wars. Unfortunately, paragraph ( 4) appears to reflect the confused claims
and counterclaims advanced during the First World War concerning the
purported distinction between offensive and defensive armament. The
attempt to employ this supposed criterion now, and in the foreseeable
future, is even more futile than the attempt to use it between 1914 and ·
1918. The traditional. law as it was developed during the two World Wars
is adequately reflected in paragraph ( 5) . Its comprehensive formulation
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is particularly appropriate in view of the m ilitary importance in antisubmarine warfare of submarine position reports made by merchant ships.
Paragraphs ( 3) through ( 6) appear to refer to typical situations in
which enemy merchant vessels have been employed in general war. For
example, the fast troop transports come under paragraph ( 6) .130 But this
paragraph, in spite of its broad formulation, probably does not reflect full y
the law developed during the World Wars. Unless the paragraph is construed more broadly than the term "naval or military auxiliary to an
enemy's armed forces" has usually been construed, it might well be possible to have an enemy merchant ship designed for carrying cargo and
actually engaged in carrying a cargo of substantial military importance
to the enemy which does not come under paragraphs ( 1) through ( 5 )
and which would not be included under ( 6) . The result of this type of
ship r1ot coming under any provision of article 503 (b) ( 3) would be that
it could not be attacked without warning and could only be captured.
The ship and its cargo would then pass unharmed by United States submarines unless, in some highly unusual situation, a United States submarine should be carrying a prize crew and be able to comply with the
traditional method of capture. 131
The provisions of this article are accurate as far as they go but are
inadequate_ in covering this one particular situation. During the past
general wars enemy cargo ships were attacked without warning even if
they did not participate otherwise in the enemy war effort. 132 They were
attacked without warning because they were cargo vessels carrying cargoes
of military importance. There is, unfortunately, no reason to believe that
such cargo ships which comply rigorously with the requirements of article
503 (b) ( 3) will be immune from attack without warning in future genera l
wars. This article, however, could provide specific grounds for claims and
counterclaims based upon charges of illegality. If this occurs, the next
steps could involve the invocation of reprisals and counterreprisals so that
a future general war could be conducted, thereafter, without regard to
this article of the Law of Naval Warfare.

3. Immune Enemy Ships
It is clear that the military 'necessity principle is honored in the
doctrines relating to enemy warships and enem y m erch an t ships as objects
of attack. The doctrines concerning the immu nity of certain enemy
ships reflect ~the attempt to p rovide implem entation of the humanity principle. Although these ships enjoy immu nity from attack by all naval forces,
130
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it is appropriate to consider this subject briefly In a study of the law
applicable to submarine warships.

a. HOSPITAL SHIPS
Hospital ships com prise the most important category of immune
ships. Under the Geneva Sea Convention of 1949 133 they must be painted
white with dark red crosses as distinguishing marks which are designed
to facilitate recognition by both surface vessels and aircraft. 134
Hague Convention X ( 1907 ) 135 was based upon the assumption that
hospital ships accompanied battle fleets and waited nearby during the
battle. When the battle was over they speedily p rovided assistance to the
wounded, shipwrecked, and drowning. In World W ar II hospital ships
performed other functions and did not u sually accom pany the combatant
naval forces. It is clear that the mere presence of a hospital ship in white
paint in the daytime and additionally lighted at night might inform the
enemy of important naval activities. Even a solitary hospital ship sailing
into a militarily important harbor or base in or near the battle zone would
serve to call the enemy's attention to it. The u sual p ractice in World War
II, consequently, was to transport the wounded while in the battle zone
on armed naval vessels, including transports which had d ischarged their
troops. After arrival at rear areas the wounded were transferred to the
hospital ships which were protected by Hague Convention X. 136
This change in the function of hospital ships is taken into account in
the Geneva Sea Convention. 137 The principal type of hospital ship recognized by it is the military hospital ship which is built or equipped "specially and wholly with a view to assisting th e wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to treating them and to transporting them." 13 8 The Convention
provides that these ships "may in no circumstan ces be attacked or captured
but shall at all times be respected and protected ." 139 The same standards
of protection are extended to private hospital ships such as those utilized
133

Citation appears in Ch. I note 66.
Art. 43.
135
Entitled: Convention for the Adap tation to Maritime War of the Principles of
the Geneva Convention. Text in 2 Scott 447. The predecessor of the foregoing 1907
Convention was the Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the ·
Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864 (Hague Peace Conference
of 1899). Text in 2 Scott 142 .
136
Mossop, "Hospital Ships in the Second World War," 24 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 398, 399
( 194 7).
137
Pictet, Commentary: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick and S hipw recked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (International Committee of the R ed Cross, 1960) provides useful analysis and legislative
history.
138
Art. 22.
139
Ibid.
1

:u

125
by National Red Cross Societies of states which are parties to the conflict
or of neutral states. 140 Aid must be rendered without distinction as to the
nationality of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. 141
It is not surprising that the Geneva Sea Convention provides for the
protection of the military interests of the belligerents. If it did not, it
would probably be impossible to attain its central humanitarian objectives.
All warships of a belligerent party to the Convention may demand the
surrender and removal from hospital ships of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked in order to make them prisoners of war and to prevent the enemy
belligerents from employing them subsequently for military purposes. 142
This authority is conditioned upon the wounded and sick being in a fit
state to be moved and the warship having adequate medical facilities. 143
Because of their inadequate passenger carrying facilities, submarines could
not provide the requisite adequate medical facilities except in unusual
circumstances.
During 1944 and 1~45 an example arose concerning capture of the
wounded under Hague Convention X. 144 The Allies allowed Germany to
send the hospital ships Tubingen and Gradisca through Allied-controlled
waters to embark sick and wounded troops in Salonica. On the return
voyage the ships were diverted to Allied ports and about 4,000 prisoners
were taken. A large percentage of the prisoners thus captured were only
slightly wounded. The action was specifically authorized by Hague Convention X 145 and no protest was made by Germany.
In summary, the Geneva Sea Convention gives belligerents a right to
control and search hospital ships in order to insure their use for humanitarian purposes only. In broad language, it prohibits the use of hospital
ships "for any military purpose" 146 or for any acts "harmful to the
enemy." 147 They may not possess or use secret communications codes. 148
The Convention provides that:
They [the parties to the conflict] can refuse assistance from these
vessels, order them off, make them take a certain course, control the
use of their wireless and other means of communication, and even
detain them for a period not exceeding seven days from the time of
interception, if the gravity of the circumstances so requires.149
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b. CARTEL AND SIMILAR SHIPS
Historically, the term cartel referred to an agreement between
enemy belligerents to regulate the exchange of prisoners of war. 150 In the
same way, cartel ships referred to vessels which were designated for use
in such an exchange. 151 In a broader sense, the term cartel is now used to
refer to other kinds of nonhostile relations regulated by special agreement
between enemy belligerents. 152
An illustration of such an arrangement and the difficulties involved in
carrying it out arose in the later part of the Second World War. In 1945
the Japanese merchant ship Awa M aru undertook a voyage agreed upon
between the United States and Japanese Governments whereby it was to
carry relief supplies furnished by the United States to United States and
Allied nationals held in Japanese custody upon the Asian mainland. 153
The vessel had been granted a safe conduct by the United States and the
other Allied powers. It had completed its outward voyage from Japan to
Hong Kong, Singapore and other ports carrying the relief supplies. On
its homeward-bound voyage it was entitled, according to the agreement,
to the full measure of immunity while following the prescribed route. On
April 1, 1945 the Awa M aru was torpedoed without warning by the United
States submarine Queenfish. At the time of the_ sinking the ship had
deviated slightly from its prescribed route but, after an investigation, the
United States assumed full responsibility for the sinking. The commanding
officer of the Queenfish was apparently unaware that the ship attacked
had been granted safe conduct by the Allies. He was relieved of his command and convicted by general court-martial for, inter alia, negligence in
carrying out orders. During the course of the ensuing diplomatic interchange, the United States offered to provide Japan with a vessel of similar
size and characteristics to replace the Awa M aru.

c. COASTAL FISHING BOATS
The case of The P aquete H abana has been referred to as an
example of customary law which is applicable in naval warfare. 154 In this
case the United States Supreme Court held that small coastal fishing boats
operating out of Havana during the Spanish-American War were nqt
liable to capture and condemnation in prize. In justifying the decision,
Mr. Justice Gray referred to the "considerations of humanity [due] to a
150
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poor and industrious order of men . . .." 155 He also explained:
The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or
their vessels, if employed for a warlike purpose, or in such a way as
to give aid or information to the enemy; nor when military or naval
operations create a necessity to which all private interests must give
way.156
A few years later the customary law reflected in The Paquete H a ban a
decision was set forth in treaty form in Hague Convention XI ( 1907) .
The exemption was expanded beyond coastal fishing boats to include
also "small boats in local trade." 157 These limitations were stated to apply
to both exempt categories:
They cease to be exempt as soon as they take any part whatever in
hostilities.
The contracting powers bind themselves not to take advantage of
the harmless character of the said vessels in order to use them for
military purposes while preserving their peaceful appearance. 158
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that even coastal fishing and trade
contribute to some extent to the enemy war effort. Apparently this was
the situation during the Korean War even though it is regarded as a limited
war. During that war a traditional close-in naval blockade was in effect 159
and the United Nations Command prohibited coastal as well as deep-sea
fishing by the North Koreans. 160 Among the reasons justifying the prohibition were the following:
Rear Admiral Smith took the attitude that this sea food was legitimate contraband and should be stringently denied [to] the Communists. The restriction of fishing by the UN blockading force would
seriously add to the Communist's logistics problems ashore, and force
them to import fish from Chinese and Russian sources. 161
The result was that the great importance of fish in the North Korean
diet made fishing a matter of military importance which outweighed the
considerations of humanity referred to by Mr. Justice Gray. In addition,
it was pointed out that a great many of the supposed North Korean fishing boats were actually engaged in laying mines. 162 Such boats would not,
of course, be exempt under the holding in The Paquete H abana or in the
conventional formulation of fishing boat immunity in Hague Convention
XI. There is no reason to believe that boats performing functions similar
155
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to those of the North Korean fishing and mining boats would be accorded
immunity in a general war.

d. OTHER IMMUNE VESSELS
Hague Convention XI ( 1907) prescribes a general immunity from
capture for "vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic
missions." 163 As a practical matter, this provision has not been often invoked in the World Wars and, when it has been invoked, narrow interpretations have been applied to it. 164 Philanthropic missions have been carried
out pursuant to special cartel arrangements entered into by the enemy
belligerents rather than under the convention.
The assumption in Hague Convention XI that scientific missions are
devoid of military significance is contrary to contemporary expectations
concerning the use of scientific knowledge. The immunity granted to vessels on scientific missions was based upon the assumption that scientific
inquiry has only a peaceful importance. In many fields scientific knowledge
is as readily adaptable for military as for peaceful purposes. 165 At the
p resent time, for example, there is inadequate charting of ocean floor
depths and contours. As nuclear submarines are enabled to submerge to
greater depths this type of oceanographic information will be of military
as well as of peaceful significance.
Further problems will arise in the near future when there will be research submarines and submersibles which are not warships operating in
the oceans of the world. 166 Many of these research vessels will be highly
specialized and not suitable for use as warships, and cannot be treated as
such. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone ( 1958) provides that, while engaged in innocent passage through
territorial waters, "submarines are required to navigate on the surface and
to show their flag." 167 It is possible that a submersible research ship, perhaps due to an error in navigation or because of the view that it is immune
as a result of its sc~entific character, may fail to comply with this rule. 168
In order to ascertain the character of the submarine or submersible and
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the possible military aspects of its mission, it may be lawfully ordered to
the surface.
An illustration of communications with submerged submarines was
provided by Special Warning No. 32 issued by the U.S. Navy Oceano·
graphic Office during the quarantine .. interdiction of Soviet missiles to Cuba
in 1962. It concerned submarine surfacing and identification procedures
when in contact with "Quarantine Forces in the general vicinity of Cuba"
and provided in part:
U.S. Forces coming in contact with unidentified submerged sub ..
marines will make the following signals to inform the sub that he may
surface in order to identify himself: Signals follow-Quarantine
forces will drop 4 to 5 harmless explosive sound signals which may be
accompanied by the International Code signal "IDKCA" meaning
"Rise to Surface." This sonar signal is normally made on underwater
communications equipment in the 8 kc. frequency range. Procedure
on receipt of signal: Submerged submarines, on hearing this signal,
should surface on easterly course. Signals and procedures employed
are harmless. 169
It must be recognized that research submarines and submersibles may
not have communication facilities comparable to those of submarine war..
ships.

4. Capture or Destruction of Neutral Merchant Ships
Historically, neutral merchant ships have not been claimed as objects
of direct military attack to as great a degree as have enemy merchant ves·
sels. It is clear that this situation was drastically changed during the World
Wars. The use of mines against enemy merchant vessels, for example,
amounted to a claim to attack neutral merchant vessels as well since
mines do not discriminate between belligerents and neutrals. 170

a. NEUTRALS

WHICH ARE INTEGRATED
ENEMY WAR EFFORT

INTO

THE

It seems clear on the basis of moral and legal principles as well as
upon the customary law developed in both World Wars, that neutral mer·
chant vessels which are integrated into the enemy war effort may be law·
fully accorded the same treatment as enemy merchant vessels which are
so integrated. It has been demonstrated that the Protocol does not protect
enemy merchant ships which are participating in the war or hostilities.
169
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There is no reason in either experience or logic why the Protocol should
be interpreted as protecting neutral merchant ships which are engaged
in the same functional activities that result in lack of protection for an
enemy merchant ship. 171
It will be recalled that the International Military Tribunal held that
Admiral Donitz violated the Protocol in ordering the sinking of neutral
merchant ships in the submarine operational area. This aspect of the
judgment has been criticized insofar as it extended to neutral merchant
ships not engaged in genuine interneutral trade. 172
The British use of ship warrants and the accompanying coercion imposed
upon neutrals have been carefully described by Miss Behrens:
In the summer of 1940 the ship warrant scheme was launched, both
to further t~e purposes of economic warfare and in order to force
neutral ships into British service or into trades elsewhere that were
held to be esssential. No ship, it was ordained ... was to be allowed
any facilities in any port of the British Commonwealth unless the
British had furnished her with a warrant. For the ill-disposed there
were to be no bunkers, or stores, or insurance, or water or credit,
no access to dry-docks, no Admiralty charts, no help or guidance or
supplies of any sort. Since the British Commonwealth covered a very
large area, and since various neutral countries, and particularly the
United States, soon began from goodwill or self-interest to co-operate
in the arrangements, trade for the ill-disposed though sometimes
possible became exceedingly difficult. 173
Certainly in a general war similar to the World Wars neutrals are not
in an enviable position. Compliance with the demands of one belligerent
will lead the opposing belligerent to regard the neutral merchant vesssel
concerned as participating in the first belligerent's war effort and so subject to treatment as though it were an enemy. 174 Whether particular
neutral merchant ships obtained ship warrants because of coercion or
because of a desire to cooperate, they were effectively integrated into the
British and Allied war effort. It is difficult to find any sound reason why
neutral merchant ships so integrated should not be subject to the same
procedures of attack, including sinking without warning, to which enemy
merchant ships may be subjected lawfully.
The ship warrant system and the effective sanctions to enforce it de171
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scribed by Miss Behrens are a part of the comprehensive administrative
methods of economic warfare practiced by the Allies during the Second
World War. The British Ministry of Economic Warfare characterized
this as a matter of changing the emphasis "from control on the seas to
control on the quays." 175 The fact was that, even assuming that visit and
search was otherwise feasible, boarding officers could not obtain adequate
information concerning the voyages, cargoes, and destinations of particular
neutral ships and they were even less able to obtain an overall view of the
attempted enemy commerce in particular contraband items. The obtaining
of accurate commercial intelligence was transferred from boarding officers
at sea to ministries or boards of economic warfare operating at home and
in neutral countries. The comprehensive economic warfare techniques including ship warrants, ship navicerts, and navicerts were not primarily
designed to intercept contraband goods en route to the enemy. They were
designed, rather, to prevent contraband goods from even being loaded upon
a ship in a neutral port. In· the same way, the certificates of enemy origin
and interest were designed to prevent any neutral shipper from giving
serious consideration to carrying enemy exports. In order to implement
these techniques, British or Allied officers examined the cargo which was
loaded in neutral ports and issued certificates stating compliance with
contraband control or with enemy export control. 176
It is clear, at least as a matter of theory, that neutrals need not cooperate
with a belligerent which is enforcing a comprehensive economic warfare
system. Noncooperation, however, would result in much more dangerous
and destructive enforcement of economic warfare regulations. The traditional techniques of enforcement at sea would be much more onerous to
the neutral ship owner. The possession of the necessary certificates under
the comprehensive system prevented neutral vessels from being subjected
to the time-consuming, costly, and dangerous procedure of diversion to
port for examination of the cargo and possible condemnation of the vessel
and cargo. In addition, the neutral merchant ship which cooperated with
the required procedures received the benefits of all the British and Allied
facilities which ·were essential to the operation of a merchant vessel. These
were, of course, the same facilities which were withheld from noncooperating neutral merchant ships under the ship warrant system. In short, the
comprehensive economic control system provides substantial benefits to
cooperating neutrals. 177
From the standpoint of the belligerent, the modern comprehensive system offers many advantages. Among these are a more complete and effici175
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ent interdiction of commerce to and from the enemy. In addition, the
system results in an economy in the use of naval vessels ·which would otherwise be required for implementing the traditional enforcement techniques
at sea. Military efficiency is advanced by the high degree of effectiveness
achieved by the comprehensive system. At the same time considerations
of humanity are advanced by its substantially less destructive characteristics
in comparison with the traditional methods. 178 In summary, the system
operates in an eminently reasonable manner and it is consequently as
_unrealistic to attempt to declare its illegality as between the enforcing
belligerents and the neutrals as it would be to attempt to do so between
the opposing belligerents.

b. NEUTRALS WHICH ARE NOT
THE WAR OR HOSTILITIES

PARTICIPATING

IN

In appraising submarine operational areas in general war it was
stated that belligerent states utilizing such areas had a legal obligation
to provide safe lanes or routes for neutral merchant ships engaged in
genuine interneutral trade. 179 In considering neutral merchant ships as
objects of attack, it is clear that everything possible should be done by the
belligerents to protect such ships which are engaged in genuine interneutral
trade. By definition, this trade does not enhance the economic war strength
of one or the other belligerent. An attack upon a neutral merchant ship
known to be engaged in interneutral trade is, therefore, a violation of law.
It should be mentioned that even though this principle is clear there are
substantial difficulties involved in actually protecting such ships in a general
war where many merchant ships are integrated into the war effort of a
belligerent. It is reasonable to expect that more effective protection for
neutral ships which are not participating in the war or hostilities can be
provided in limited war situations.

5. Enemy Personnel as Objects of Attack
It is lawful to kill or wound enemy combatants, that is, naval or
merchant marine personnel, pursuant to a lawful attack upon an enemy
178
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warship or merchant ship. During such an attack it is not only lawful to
kill or wound the combatant personnel, but it is also lawful to kill or wound
the otherwise especially protected medical and religious personnel incidental to the attack on the ship. 180 In general, the legal doctrines concerning personnel as objects of attack perform the relatively modest role of
prohibiting violence which is already unnecessary to achieve the military
objective of an attack. As a rule, enemy naval or merchant marine personnel who have become helpless or who have come under the power of a
belligerent are no longer lawful objects of attack. The result is that subsequent or continuing violence which is directed against them is illegal.
a. THE DUTY TO GIVE QUARTER

The duty to grant quarter when an enemy surrenders is as applicable to sea warfare as it is to land warfare. 181 In sea warfare there are
special problems including the mode of manifesting surrender. The Trial
of Von Ruchteschell, 182 where the defendant was the commander of a
German surface raider, illustrates some of the issues arising in connection
with the duty to give quarter at sea. There were two charges that the
defendant had continued the attack after the enemy merchant ship had
indicated surrender. The first charge involved a daylight attack against the
Davisian in which its wireless aerial was destroyed with the raider's first
salvo. 183 The raider maintained heavy fire and signaled that the ship
attacked was not to use its radio. The report states: "The captain of the
Davisian stopped his engines, hoisted an answering pennant and acknowledged the signal." 184 The gunfire continued fifteen minutes longer, however, and wounded several members of the crew while they were trying
to abandon ship. The basis of the conviction of the accused on this charge
was apparently that the ship attacked had given an unequivocal indication
of surrender.
The second charge involving refusal to give quarter involved a night
attack upon the Empire Dawn in which the raider's first salvo set the
180
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bridge on fire and destroyed the wireless. 185 Even though the ship under
attack was rendered powerless by the first salvo, it continued to move
through the water and was still moving when it began to sink. The Empire
Dawn did not open fire and its captain signaled by torch that he was
abandoning ship. During these events the raider's fire continued while the
lifeboats were being lowered and cut the lines of one of the lifeboats. It
crashed into the sea and several members of the crew were killed. The
accused was not convicted on this charge and the apparent distinction
was that the Empire Dawn had not given an unequivocal manifestation
of surrender. In addition, it seems probable that the torch signal from the
burning ship could not have been seen on the raider. The fact that the
ship was actually sinking while the raider's fire continued appears to have
been inadequate consideration.
In this case two naval officers, one British and one German, appeared
as expert witnesses. Their common evidence concerning manifestation of
surrender was summarized as follows:
( 1) the attacked ship must stop her engines; ( 2) if the attacker signals,
the signal must be answered-if the wireless is out of action, it must
be answered by a signalling pennant by day or by a torch or flashlight
by night; ( 3) the guns must not be manned, the crew should be amidships and taking to the lifeboats; ( 4) the white flag may be hoisted
by day and by night, all the ship's lights should be put on. 186
The duty to give quarter is, of course, the same in submarine warfare
as it is in other naval warfare. There are undoubtedly unusual problems
which occur concerning manifestations of surrender in submarine warfare.
A submarine even when fully surfaced lies low in the water. There may
be, consequently, particular difficulties in observing a submarine's manifestation of surrender. Where a submarine is forced to the surface following
depth charging, it seems reasonable that the submarine's commander
should be given an opportunity to surrender unless an unequivocal intention of fighting it out on the surface is manifested. The attempt of a surface
ship to indicate surrender to a submerged submarine also raises problems.
For example, it is clear that the submerged submarine at periscope d~pth
has only limited visibility.

b. DUTIES TO SURVIVORS
The rescue of survivors is particularly important in sea warfare.
If the survivors are not rescued within a short period of time, their chance
of survival is greatly reduced. The common interest of states in rescuing
survivors is reflected in the Geneva Sea Convention:
After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay,
185
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take all possible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked,
wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment,
to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent
their being despoiled. 187
The notes to the Trial of Von Ruchteschell state the following propositions concerning duties to survivors:
( 1) [I]f the raider is aware of survivors who have taken to their lifeboats, he must make reasonable efforts to rescue them; (2) it is no
defence that the survivors did not draw attention to their boats if they
had reasonable grounds to believe that no quarter was being given. 188
There can be no doubt concerning the urgency of rescue in submarine
warfare. Rescue in such a context, unfortunately, appears to be particularly
difficult. It is especially dangerous to attempt the rescue of submarine personnel if other submarines are in the vicinity. Where the rescue by submarines of surviving personnel is in issue, the grim facts are that submarines
in both World Wars were small vessels without adequate passenger
facilities.
·
Admiral Donitz was charged before the International Military Tribunal
with ordering the killing of survivors and issuing orders prohibiting rescue.189 It will be recalled that the basic rule in the second paragraph of
the Protocol prohibits a warship from sinking "a merchant vessel" unless
the passengers and crew are first put in a place of safety. In its application
of this provision of the Protocol in its judgment in the case of Admiral
Donitz, the Tribunal stated:
The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions [of the
Protocol] were not carried out and that the Defendant ordered that
they should not be carried out. The argument of the Defense is that
the security of the submarine is, as the first rule of the sea, paramount
to rescue, and that the development of aircraft made rescue impossible. This may be so, but the Protocol is explicit. If the commander
cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel
and should allow it to pass harmless before his periscope. These orders,
then, prove Donitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol. 190
Perhaps the most obvious inadequacy of the quoted portion of the judgment is that the Protocol, as demonstrated above, only applies to merchant
vessels which are not participating in the war or hostilities. One may
seriously question, consequently, whether or not among the merchant ships
sunk by German submarines during the Second World War there were
any significant number of cases where the Protocol, including its rescue
187
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provisions, was applicable. In addition, the opinion of the Tribunal ignores
the facts of submarine warfare including the lack of space for passengers
in submarines.
An adequate sense of reality on this subject may be achieved by consideration of Admiral Nimitz' answer to a question propounded on behalf
of Admiral Donitz by the International Military Tribunal:
13. Q. Were, by order or on general principles, the U.S. submarines
prohibited from carrying out rescue measures toward passengers and crews of ships sunk without warning in those cases
where by doing so the safety of the own boat was endangered?
A. On general principles the U.S. submarines did not rescue
enemy survivors if undue additional hazard to the submarine
resulted or the submarine would thereby be prevented from
accomplishing its further mission. U.S. submarines were limited in rescue measures by small passenger-carrying facilities
combined with the known desperate and suicidal character of
the enemy. Therefore it was unsafe to pick up many survivors.
Frequently the survivors were given rubber boats and/or provisions. Almost invariably survivors did not come aboard the
submarine voluntarily and it was necessary to take them prisoner by force. 191
Thus, according to Admiral Nimitz, United States submarines did not
attempt rescue if either additional danger existed or if the submarine's
military mission would be frustrated. It seems neither reasonable nor just
fo require a different standard on the part of German submarines. Even if
more were to be required as a matter of legal doctrine it is difficult to see
how such a rule could be sanctioned unless submarines were provided with
more adequate passenger-carrying facilities.
It should be mentioned also that there were apparently numerous instances when it was not feasible for surface warships to make rescue attempts even though they had adequate passenger facilities. The British
heavy cruiser Devonshire, operating in the South Atlantic, sank the German
raider Atlantis on November 22, 1941 and the German supply ship Py~hon
on November 30, 1941. In neither case was rescue attempted since it was
thought that U -boats might be in the vicinity. 192
To say that rescue cannot be attempted by submarines in the two situations stated by Admiral Nimitz is not to say that submarines cannot render
other assistance to survivors. Admiral Nimitz referred to giving "rubber
boats and/ or provisions" to the survivors. There is no reason why assistance
of this kind should not be regarded ~s legally obligatory when rescue is not
191

40 1.1\.J.T. 108, 110.
I d. at 99; Ruge, Der Seekreig: The German Navy's Story 1939- 1945 175- 76
( 1957).
192

137
possible and when military necessity permits. In summary, there is an obligation to rescue survivors when there is neither undue hazard to the submarine nor an interference with its military mission. When these conditions
exist there is a particular obligation to assist survivors short of rescue, as by
righting overturned lifeboats and providing rubber boats, food, and medical
supplies. Humanitarian considerations and acts must be encouraged in
every practical way even though they have had a secondary role to military
necessity in combat situations.
The German attempt to establish a rescue zone of immunity during the
period September 12-16, 1942 following the sinking of the British troopship
Laconia and its frustration by the United States aircraft bombing attack
has been described. 193 On September 17, 1942 the German U-boat Command issued the "Laconia Order." 194 It was not given to U -boat captains
in writing but it was regularly read or stated to them as a part of the
briefing they received before leaving on war patrols. It provided:
( 1) No attempt of any .kind must be made at rescuing members
of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and
putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over
food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of
warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.
( 2) Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.
( 3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements would be of
importance for your boat.
( 4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for
women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities. 195
It should be taken into consideration that at the time of the issuance of
the quoted order Admiral Donitz must have been under severe psychological pressure in view of the attack made upon the German submarines
engaged in the Laconia rescue operations. It is apparent that the quoted
· order is inconsistent internally. Paragraph ( 1) appears to prohibit rescue
while paragraphs ( 2) and ( 3) seem to justify, or even to order, rescue in
particular circumstances. The admonition of harshness contained in paragraph ( 4) is subject to diverse interpretations.
In its judgment concerning Admiral Donitz the Tribunal stated:
It is also asserted that the German U-boat arm not only did not
carry out the warning and rescue provisions of the Protocol but that
Donitz deliberately ordered the killing of survivors of shipwrecked
vessels, whether enemy or neutral. ... The Defense argues that these
orders [including the Laconia order] and the evidence supporting
193
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them do not show such a policy and introduced much evidence to the
contrary. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the evidence does not
establish with the certainty required that Donitz deliberately ordered
the killing of shipwrecked survivors. The orders were undoubtedly
ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure. 196
There are some aspects of the quoted judgment which present difficulties.
It is possible that the Tribunal regarded the ambiguity of the order as
arising from doubt as to whether the purpose of the order was to forbid
rescue or was to direct the killing of survivors. If it was the latter, it was
unlawful but the Tribunal acted with restraint in resolving the ambiguity
in favor of Admiral Donitz in the criminal proceedings. If the Laconia
order was an attempt to prohibit the rescue of survivors in the situations
of operational necessity in which Admiral Nimitz indicated that survivors
were not rescued by United States submarines in the Pacific, the order was
lawful in this respect. 197
The real basis for criticism of the order is the reference in the first
paragraph to not assisting survivors as by putting them in lifeboats and
giving them provisions. These statements are contrary to the legal obligations of submarine personnel to assist survivors when military necessity
prevents their conducting rescue operations. This illegal portion of the
Laconia order should not be justified as a reprisal measure to the aircraft
attack upon the German submarines engaged in the rescue operations.
During the Second World War Hague Convention X ( 1907) was in effect
and it contained no specific prohibition concerning directing reprisals at
survivors. Elementary considerations of humanity and morality would,
nevertheless, indicate conclusively that reprisals should not be directed at
helpless survivors of a sunken ship. Reprisals against survivors including
the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked are expressly prohibited by the Geneva
Sea Convention. 198
In the Trial of Moehle 199 the defendant was a German U-boat flotilla
commander who was charged with a war crime in the contents of the
instructions he gave to his commanding officers prior to their departure on
war patrols. The briefing consisted primarily of technical matters but the
defendant read the Laconia order. If questions were asked, he provided
two examples. 200 The first concerned a U-boat commander who reported
seeing a raft with five British airmen on it in the Bay of Biscay. It was
stated that he was severely reprimanded by the U -boat Command and was
told that the correct action would have been to destroy the raft since
196
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otherwise it was probable that the airmen would be rescued and go into
action again. The second example involved the sinking of American ships
near land. The official criticism directed against the submarine commanders was said to be that the crews had not been destroyed but probably
reached the coast and manned new ships. After giving these examples, the
defendant said that each commander must act according to the dictates of
his conscience and that the safety of his boat should be his primary consideration.
The defense argued that the Laconia order was ambiguous but that its
purpose was to impress upon submarine commanders that they should not
rescue survivors since doing so endangered the submarines. 201 It was thus
regarded as a legal order based upon operational necessity. The prosecution
contended that the purpose of the order was to direct the killing of survivors.202 The central legal issue, however, concerned Moehle's role in
commenting upon the order. The court apparently regarded his stated
examples as resolving its ambiguities and thereby changing it into an order
to kill survivors and he was convicted. 203
·
Perhaps the most obvious duty to survivors is to refrain from killing
them. Unfortunately this duty has been violated in some instances. The
importance of the subject justifies separate consideration.

c. THE PROHIBITION OF KILLING SURVIVORS
Survivors struggling in the water or seeking safety on life rafts or
1n lifeboats are no longer effective instruments of enemy military power.
It should be abundantly clear that they are not lawful objects of attack.
In The Peleus Trial 204 the commander of the German submarine U-852
and three officers and a rating of the same submarine were charged with:
Committing a war crime in that you in the Atlantic Ocean on the
night of 13/14th March, 1944, when Captain and members of the
crew of Unterseeboot 852 which had sunk the steamship Peleus in
violation of the laws and usages of war were concerned in the killing
of members of the crew of the said steamship, Allied nationals, by
firing and throwing grenades at them. 205
The prosecution resolved the uncertainty in the charge by stating that the
201
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defendants were not accused of sinking the merchant ship without warning but of killing its survivors. 206
The crew of the Peleus consisted of thirty-five individuals comprising
eight nationalities. The ship was of Greek registration and was under
charter to the British Ministry of War Transport. Following the sinking
of the ship many of the surviving crew members climbed aboard rafts or
floating wreckage. The submarine cruised about the scene for approximately five hours after the sinking while the survivors and the wreckage
were made the objects of machine gun and hand grenade attack. Practically all of the survivors were either killed or subsequently died of wound_s
except for three who managed to conceal themselves and stay alive. They
were rescued about a month later and recounted these grim events. 207
The U -852 was, thereafter, beached under air attack on the east coast of
Africa and its log revealed the sinking of a merchant ship at the location
where the Peleus was sunk. The prosecution relied upon affidavits prepared
by the three survivors of the Peleus as well as upon testimony of members
of the crew of the U -boat who were not directly involved in the killing.
The evidence indicated that the defendant, Eck, the captain of the U-boat,
ordered the shooting and throwing of hand grenades at the rafts and the
wreckage and that the other accused carried out his orders.
The defense of Eck was based principally upon the claim that it was
operationally necessary for him to eliminate all traces of the sinking in
order to save the U-boat from Allied antisubmarine warfare measures. 208
Eck was aware of the aircraft bombing attack on the submarines which
were rescuing the survivors of the Laconia. He testified on this subject:
This case showed me that on the enemy's side military reasons take
precedence over human reasons before saving the lives of survivors.
For that reason I thought my measures justified. 209
Eck was also aware of the Laconia order but he did not invoke it as a
superior order which directed his actions. 210 If he had done so it would
have had very unfavorable consequences for Admiral Donitz in the later
206
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trial before the International Military Tribunal. 211 The other accused
relied principally upon the plea of superior orders, specifically, Eck's orders
to them. 212
An experienced U -boat commander testified in behalf of the defense. 213
He emphasized the efficiency and rapidity of Allied antisubmarine counterattack measures at the time and in the area of the sinking of the Peleus.
Under questioning by the judge advocate this officer conceded that he
would not have done the same thing that Eck did in the circumstances. 214
Apparently he would have followed the usual U-boat procedure of leaving
the scene of a sinking at high speed. Since the particular sinking took
place at night it would have been relatively safe for the U -boat to use
its high-surface speed during the hours of darkness. Whatever defensive
action was taken by the U -boat following the sinking it is probable that
even if all of the wreckage had been destroyed the place of the sinking
would have been marked by an oil slick easily visible from the air. 215
Eck and two of the accused officers (one was the ship's medical officer)
were found guilty and condemned to death. 216 The remaining two accused
were also found guilty but received lesser sentences because of mitigating
circumstances. 217 Eck's defense of operational necessity was not justified
and this was conceded even by the veteran submarine commander called
by the defense. The facts demonstrate that helpless survivors were murdered on the high seas. 218 It is also clear that the plea of superior orders did
kill survivors. 1 War Crimes Trials 226-29 (appendix 22) ; 40 I.M.T. 51 (Donitz
Document-36) .·
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not justify the actions of the other defendants since Eck's orders were
illegal upon their face.
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
states:
Inhumane, illegal warfare at sea was waged by the Japanese Navy
in 1943 and 1944. Survivors of passengers and crews of torpedoed
ships were murdered. 219
The Far East Tribunal judgment quotes a command in an order issued
by the Commander of the Japanese First Submarine Force at Truk on
March 20, 1943:
All submarines shall act together in order to concentrate their attacks
against enemy convoys and shall totally destroy them. Do not stop
with the sinking of enemy ships and cargoes; at the same time, you
will carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the enemy's
ships; if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy. 220
There is convincing evidence that this order was carried out on several
occasions. A number of examples are referred to in the judgment of the
Far East Tribunal. 221 One which is summarized involved the sinking of
the United States Liberty-type merchant ship Jean Nicolet which had an
armament manned by a U.S. Navy Armed Guard. 222 The judgment states:
The massacre of survivors of the American ship "Jean Nicolet" is
another example of methods employed by the Japanese Navy. This
ship was travelling from Australia to Ceylon in July 1944 when she
was torpedoed at night by a Japanese submarine while some 600
miles from land. Her ship's company was about 100 of whom about
90 were taken aboard the submarine. The ship was sunk and her boats
were also smashed by gun fire although all did not sink. The hands
of the survivors were tied behind their backs. A few of the officers were
taken below and their fate is not known to the Tribunal. The remainder were made to sit on the forward deck of the submarine as she
cruised searching for survivors. During this time some were washed
overboard and others were beaten with wooden and metal bludgeons
decision in the Peleus case and was so argued by the prosecution. 1 War Crimes
Trials 117-19; 1 Reps. U.N. Comm. 19, 20.
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and robbed of personal property such as watches and rings. Then
they were required to proceed singly towards the stern between lines
of Japanese who beat them as they passed between their ranks. Thus
they were forced into the water to drown. Before all the prisoners had
been forced to run the gauntlet the vessel submerged leaving the remaining prisoners on her deck to their fate. Some, however, did survive by swimming. These and their comrades whom they kept afloat
were discovered the next day by aircraft which directed a rescuing
ship to them. Thus twenty-two survived this terrible experience, from
some of whom this Tribunal received testimony of this inhumane conduct of the Japanese Navy. 223
The attacks upon the surviving personnel of the Peleus and the Jean
N icolet have been examined here because both of the incidents have major
significance for the international law of sea warfare. The central point
is that the enemy, particularly _when he is helpless and struggling for survival, must be regarded as within the broad scope of the common humanity
of all mankind. 224 Only when the victims are dehumanized in the view of
their enemy are they likely to be treated as were the survivors of the Peleus
and the Jean .l\ficolet.
.
There is the urgent need for worldwide recognition
and effective implementation of the right of all individuals to fair and nondiscriminatory treatment, even in situations of coercion and violence. A
concrete step toward this goal can be achieved by enforcing the Geneva
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims and the elementary prohibition of killing survivors.

6. Objects and Methods of Attack in Future General War
The same types of general war which have been postulated p reviously
in this study are now employed to appraise objects and methods of attack.
These types are a nonnuclear general war similar to the World Wars or
the same type of war with a restricted use of nuclear weapons. 2 25 T he principal legal issue arising concerning the objects and methods of attack of
223

F.E.I.M.T. ]udg. pp. 1074-75.
Beach, Run Silent, Run Deep 319- 22 (Permabook ed. 1956) describes a United
States submarine sinking by ramming each of the lifeboats of a sun ken Japanese
Q-ship. Even though the account appears in a novel, it p rovid es a ccura te illustration
of the murder of survivors and the psychological attitud es which cause it.
~From your perspective or mine the creative opportunity is to achieve a selfsystem la rger than the primary ego; larger than the ego components of family,
friends, profession, or nation; a nd inclusive of ma nkind.
L a sswell, " I ntrod uction: Universality Versus Pa rochialism," in McDougal & Felicia no xix, xxiv.
225
Ad miral Biorklund of the Swed ish Navy postu lates a general war involving
restricted use of nuclear weapons in which merchant ships would be principal objects
of a ttack in "Sea-Air Strategy and Submarine Warfare II," 104 ]. Royal United
S erv. lnst. 203 ( 1959 ) .

144
submarines in such a future war is whether or not merchant ships participating in the naval war effort may be attacked lawfully without warning. In resolving this issue, appropriate weight must be accorded to the
past process of legal decision in general war.
During the First World War there was, without doubt, widespread
shock and revulsion at the destruction of the "noncombatant" human
values involved in the German use of submarines. 226 In commenting upon
that German unrestricted submarine warfare, Professor Garner has written:
The rule referred to [concerning safety] was adopted for the protection of innocent non-combatants, not for the benefit of belligerents,
and it cannot be admitted that the invention of new instruments
repeals or modifies the rule. The use of the [submarine] instrument
must be adjusted to the requirements of the law of nations and of
humanity and not they to the instrument. 227
There can be no dispute concerning the desirability of according priority
to the principle of humanity. It is apparent, nevertheless, that enforceable
legal doctrines which accord some consideration to humanity are better
than unenforceable ones which accord all consideration to it. The only
difficulty presented by Professor Garner's demand for humanity is that it
cannot be enforced in combat situations, even to a modest degree, without
taking full account of the complementary principle of military necessity.
In the Second World War the United States adopted the same methods
of submarine warfare which it had regarded as indefensible in the earlier
war. The military utility of the submarine against the merchant ship when
attacks were made without warning was of decisive importance. Even if
doubt remained after the First World War, it is clear now that the principle of humanity has been adjusted to the requirements of the efficient
military use of submarines. As Professor Lauterpacht has recognized, the
problem of "unrestricted submarine warfare" is a part of the larger question concerning the validity of the combatant-noncombatant distinction
in general war. 228 In referring to civilians on land who were the victims
of the long-distance blockade, he has stated:
The practice of two world wars was based on the view that no such
sacrosanctity attaches to the civilian population at large as to make
illegal the effort to starve it alongside the miltary forces of the enemy
as a means of inducing him to surrender. 229
It is certainly regrettable, but nevertheless a fact, that civilians who have
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embarked upon merchant ships which are engaged in the naval war effort
in one way or another have shared the fate of those ships. 230
In identifying objects of attack in the event of a future general war_,
it must be recalled that the nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed attack
submarine is a much more efficient combatant unit than its predecessors
of the World Wars. In general war it is most unlikely that other considerations will be given priority over those concerning military efficiency in
the use of such submarines. It is probable, therefore, that merchant ships
participating in the naval war effort of one belligerent will be subject to
attack without warning by the submarines of the opposing belligerent.
This has been appraised as lawful under the Protocol in World War II
and it will be lawful also in a future general war if the past process of
decision is a reliable guide. 231 The destructiveness of human values involved in the use of nuclear attack submarines would be even less disproportionate to their military efficiency than was the situation involving
the use of traditional submarineS in both World Wars.
Writing in 1934, Admiral Richmond stated:
Effective as the submarine may be in attack upon mercantile shipping, she is of negligible use in its direct defense. A convoy cannot
be defended by submarines .... 23 2
The statement was not only accurate when made but remained valid
during World War II. The advent of nuclear-powered submarines with
high underwater speeds has probably changed the situation drastically.
The contemporary nuclear attack submarine may be susceptible of efficient
utilization in protecting surface merchant ships from enemy attack submarines. If submarine merchant ships and nonpowered towed submarine
cargo carriers 233 are to be escorted effectively, the escorts must be submarines. In this context of possible future submarine warfare it is probable
that submarine merchant ships will be subject to sinking without warning
as their surface predecessors have been in two World Wars. There is no
basis upon which to conclude that such sinkings would be a violation of
the Protocol if the objects of attack were participating in any way in the
war or hostilities. 234
The world community interest in limiting violence is not advanced by
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the practice of subjecting merchant ships participating in the war or hostilities to submarine attack without warning even though the practice must
be appraised as lawful. This situation is, however, only a part of the
overall community interest. This broader community interest in limiting
violence is not advanced by general war. The attempt to find a further
limitation of violence in submarine warfare must be made in the context
of limited war.

C. CLAIMS CONCERNING OBJECTS AND METHODS OF
ATTACK IN UMITED WAR
The Harvard Research, Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval
and Aerial War states:
It seems obviously impossible to distinguish in a Draft Convention
between "small" wars and "large" wars and it is accordingly impossible to lay down two set of rules applicable to the two different types
of situations. 235
Draft conventions and other "restatements" often reveal excessive concern with abstract doctrinal formulations without sufficient regard to the
great variations in the factual context which exist. 236 Considering the
importance of the human values which are involved, it is worth the effort
to consider objects and methods of attack in limited war situations. In~
addition, Professor Osgood has stated the important point that: "The
decisive limitation upon war is the limitation of the objectives of war." 237
The same two types of limited war context which have been considered
previously will be employed again.

I. Claims by Major Powers in Limited War
In a limited war between rna jor powers involving the use of submarines, it may be confidently predicted that the newest and most efficient
235
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types of nuclear attack submarines will be involved. 238 The central question concerns the mutuaf restraints relating to objects of attack which the
major belligerent powers would recognize. A hopeful condition which may
be postulated is that the enemy commerce at sea would be likely to be a
much less significant object of attack than it was during the World Wars.
There are several factors which tend to make this postulate a realistic one.
First, a limited war between major Powers is unlikely to require a full
effort by the productive forces of the economy. Second, it would probably
not be necessary to devote a large proportion of a state's merchant marine
to the functions of supplying the economy with necessary raw materials
and of transporting troops and supplies to the battle areas. Third, to attempt to achieve complete interdiction of enemy commerce at sea, as was
done during the World Wars, would make it very difficult to retain the
limited characteristics of the war.
If the enemy commerce at sea were a less important object of attack,
the risks involved in an all-out- attack against enemy merchant shipping,
including sinking without warning, would not be proportionate to the value of the military objective sought. In these circumstances, rational belligerents mindful of their self-interests would refrain from attacks upon
enemy merchant vessels without warning.
It has been concluded that the Protocol does not extend its protection
to merchant ships participating in the naval war effort. 239 This interpretation was made with reference to the context of general war and should
not be applied automatically in limited war. In addition, the commerce
in limited \var which has just been described is not participating directly
in the naval war effort. The merchant ships involved are actually performing functions closer to those which are regarded as peaceful than those
deemed warlike. In this factual context, there are good reasons to extend
the protection of the Protocol to them. The reasons are more persuasive
if it is postulated that these merchant ships present no military danger to
submarines. Consequently, the Protocol should be interpreted as applying
to and protecting such merchant ships.
It is probable, even where sea commerce in general is not an important
object of attack, that sea transportation to the actual battle areas will continue to be militarily necessary in order to maintain a flow of troops and
supplies. Merchant ships engaged in such transportation could reasonably
be regarded as subject to attack without warning. Since these merchant
ships are participating in the war or hostilities, they should be deemed to
be lawful objects of attack without warning under the Protocol. All merchant ships would, of course, be exempt from such attack if the rna jor
belligerents agreed, either expressly or by implication, only to regard
238
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regular warships as the objects of attack without warning. If this were to
be done, it would be a significant indication that the war was to be kept
limited. 240

2. Claims by Minor Powers in Limited War
In this type of limited war it is also possible that the enemy commerce
at sea would not be a particularly important object of attack. In addition,
there are other factors wh ich can be expected to be especially effective as
to minor powers. Such powers will probably not acquire the expensive and
efficient nuclear attack submarines in the near future. The relative military
inefficiency of their submarines in comparison with nuclear submarines
may cause them to limit the scope of the objects of attack and the severity
of the methods of attack. The particular objects of attack which are selected by minor powers should be influenced by their restricted military
capabilities. There is little point in proclaiming enemy merchant ships to
be objects of attack without warning if there is an inadequate submarine
capability to carry out such attacks.
In this type of war the dangers of escalation from sinking without warning should also be considered. Further, if neutral merchant ships are sunk
without warning as a result of errors in iden tification it could lead to
possible further military involvement by a m inor power which may be
already involved near the limits of its military capability. It may be expected also that minor powers must take into consideration the interests
of major powers which are not participants in the war. The common
interests of the world community would be served effectively if the major
powers indicated as overriding interest in restricting the war or hostilities.241
It has been suggested that there are some situations remote from the
well-traveled sea lanes where the protection of the Protocol can be extended
to merchant ships during a general war. 2 42 Such situations should certainly
exist in a limited war between major powers, and there should be even
more opportunities to apply the Protocol in a limited war between minor
powers. The principal reason for this conclusion is that such a war may
well present a number of fact situations in which merchant ships are not
participating in the war or h ostilities. In a situation involving a single
merchant ship the tactica l context may permit, and even obligate, a submarine to comply with all the requirements of the Protocol applicable to
240
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merchant ships which are not participating in the war or hostilities. In
such situations the submarine commander would be required to make an
evaluation of the particular case, considering its tactical context and balancing and applying the principles of military necessity and humanity.
The fact that such individualized evaluations were not feasible In the
World Wars is not a persuasive reason to fail to attempt them in the
different contexts of some limited war situations.
Finally, the obligations to survivors in this type of limited war, as well
as in one between major Powers, should be emphasized. Aside from situations of urgent military necessity of the kind referred to by Admiral
Nimitz 243 which are more typical of general war situations, a legal obligation should be recognized to put personnel in a place of safety before
sinking or, at the least, to rescue survivors after sinking and accord them
status as prisoners of war or as protected persons. 244
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